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ABSTRACT 
 
Selma is one of three World War I concrete shipwrecks in the Galveston area. 
While the other two are not identified, one of them is likely the Durham. This research 
explores how and why these ships ended their service here, and looks at the different 
methods used for the creation of early concrete ships and the differences in their 
performance. 
Selma, one of twelve Emergency Fleet Corporation ships, had a much different 
design than Durham, but both of the ships were out of use quickly after launch. Selma 
ran aground and damaged its bow; it was subsequently taken to Galveston for repairs 
that never occurred. Durham proved to be a very poor sailor, but remained afloat for 
many more years before becoming a fishing pier in Galveston. Both of these ships have 
histories of re-use that last beyond their abandonment.   
This research focuses on the history and construction of Selma and Durham. The 
text discusses the developments that lead to the development of these ships and how they 
fared after construction.  Additionally, visual survey of how the condition of Selma has 
changed over time is included. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Along the path of the Galveston-Bolivar Ferry route in Galveston, Texas there is 
an unusual sight: a concrete ship is sticking out of the water. While this ship, SS Selma, 
is the most visible and most famous, it is in fact one of three concrete shipwrecks in the 
Galveston area. All three are partially exposed above the water, but only Selma has been 
positively identified. The smallest wreck is located off Bolivar peninsula in the Gulf of 
Mexico near Bolivar Flats and the third wreck is located near the end of the Port 
Bolivar’s north jetty. SS Durham is a likely candidate for the identity of one of the 
unidentified wrecks, but there is no record confirming which wreck it may be. 
 Both Selma and Durham date to World War I and have unique stories that 
highlight the struggle to adapt new construction materials and methods to combat the 
wartime shortage of merchant ships. Concrete ships were created to provide a quicker 
and cheaper way to resupply and expand the merchant fleet during World War I. As with 
any new technology or method, different approaches were attempted to reach the same 
result. Concrete ships were no exception. The basic objectives and ideas behind each of 
the concrete ships were the same as with other materials; cost, efficiency, speed of 
construction, and sufficient internal reinforcement to provide strength.  
 Although oceangoing concrete ships were a new concept, the use of concrete for 
marine purposes was not a new idea. Small concrete barges and boats had been used in 
Europe and the United States since 1887. The technique used to build them had been 
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around for almost forty years from the building of the first concrete boat but was mostly 
ignored in favor of iron and steel until necessity created a demand. Both Selma and 
Durham were believed to be ships that would help concrete emerge as a viable and 
possibly even favored method of ship construction. 
 This thesis will research the history and construction of these ships. While these 
vessels were built for similar reasons, their construction and history vary greatly. The 
current and past condition of the hulls as shipwrecks will also be compared in a visual 
survey using photos from various time periods.  
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CHAPTER II  
HISTORY 
 
Beginnings of Concrete Ships 
 
The earliest forms of concrete watercraft were ferrocement boats. The genesis of these 
boats started in 1848 when Joseph Louis Lambot, a French inventor, created ferciment, 
an early form of ferrocement. Ferrocement is made by applying mortar or plaster around 
an internal support structure of metal rods and mesh. It is the added reinforcement of the 
continuous mesh that separates ferrocement from standard reinforced concrete. 
  
Figure 1. First concrete rowboat made by Joseph Lambot. Reprinted from “Concrete Ships: historical 
notes concerning them and a discussion of the problems involved in their construction.”. 1 
 
                                                 
1
 Paul Kircher, “Concrete Ships: historical notes concerning them and a discussion of the problems 
involved in their construction.” (Unpublished Masters thesis University of Illinois, 1918), 7. 
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Two of his early creations with ferrocement were rowboats (Figure 1), which he used on 
his pond and one of which he exhibited at the 1855 World’s Fair in Paris, France. He 
built the boat using internal reinforcement of iron bars covered with one layer of iron 
mesh to create the shape. In 1855, he applied for a patent for fericiment describing it as 
“a new product which helps to replace timber where it is endangered by wetness, as in 
wood flooring, water containers, plant pots, etc.”2 Along with the patent, Lambot also 
produced a pamphlet naming seven qualities of his new product. These qualities 
included “1. Non-inflammable. 2. Cheap to use. 3. Requires no upkeep. 4. Quick to build 
in. 5. Easily repaired in the event of damage. 6. Chemically stable. 7. Impervious to 
water.”3 Lambot was one of many inventors and engineers working with various 
iterations of early reinforced concrete, but his method was the first and “fundamentally 
similar” to the technique in general use worldwide for the construction of various 
concrete vessels.
4
 These boats were made to last as his 1855 rowboat was reported to 
still be useable at the start of World War I.
5
 One is still displayed at the Museum of 
Brignolais. Lambot’s invention did not create a building technique that was immediately 
adopted, but set the stage for the ships that were to come. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Gainor W. Jackson, Jnr and W. Morley Sutherland, Concrete Boatbuilding (London, 1969), 28. 
3
 Ibid, 29. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 “Ships of Stone,” Scientific American, CXIX, No. 9 (August 1918), 165. 
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Early concrete ships in Europe 
Following the creation of concrete small boats, there was a lull before the concept started 
to spread. In 1887, a small barge, Zeeneuw, was built in Holland by the Picha-Stevens 
brothers and the idea of concrete boats started to spread across Europe. Holland’s canals 
became the home of many concrete barges ranging from fifty to sixty tons. Along with 
Holland, the nations of Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Panama, Australia, and the United 
States all started to build concrete boats. These vessels were fairly small and used for 
inland waterways, many of them being barges that ranged from a capacity of fifteen tons 
to 500 tons. One of the traits that made concrete barges desirable and popular was 
durability.  
 
Figure 2. Ninety-foot barge built in Mobile from 1912. Reprinted from “Concrete Ships: historical notes 
concerning them and a discussion of the problems involved in their construction.”6 
                                                 
6
 Paul Kircher, “Concrete Ships: historical notes concerning them and a discussion of the problems 
involved in their construction.” (Unpublished Master’s thesis University of Illinois, 1918), 13. 
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The barge built by the Picha-Stevens brothers in Holland was “reported to have 
encountered a number of severe collisions with larger vessels, and many times it has 
been frozen in the ice all winter; yet it proved unusually stable and durable.”7 An 
American barge made in Mobile, Alabama in 1912 was in service until it got caught in a 
1916 storm and one side was punctured; in 1918, as the need for ships and the interest in 
concrete grew, the barge was repaired quickly and returned to service. There are many 
other examples of the durability of concrete barges that helped to make them popular in 
the early 1900s especially since they were also cheap to build.  Some of these barges 
were even used in the war effort: the Italian army relied on concrete barges along the 
Piave River to transport its heavy guns for operations against the Austrians.
8
 Even with 
all the advances made in the area of concrete boats, it was not until late in World War I 
with the shortage of steel encouraged the pouring of the first seagoing concrete ships. 
The first self-propelled concrete ship for ocean use was Namsenfjord, a 
Norwegian ship launched in 1917. This ship was built and designed by N.K. Fougner, 
who then built four more. Due to widespread skepticism by engineers and sailors that a 
concrete ship would actually work, the Norwegian government had him make it using 
his own money and required a sea trial before they would allow it to be used for trade or 
sold. After the success of the first ship, the government allowed him to build more, but 
once again he had to front the capital to make the ships. Following the launching of the 
                                                 
7
 “Ships of Stone,” Scientific American, CXIX, No. 9 (August 1918), 165. 
8
 “Ships of Stone,” Scientific American, CXIX, No. 9 (August 1918), 179. 
7 
fifth ship, they were given provisional classification by Lloyd’s Register.9 This
classification was chosen due to the lack of examples and knowledge of the ships. In 
1918, the United Kingdom launched Armistice, a 1,150-ton cargo carrier, to help with 
their war effort. It was built in the same style as the Norwegian ships, and “the Managers 
say that she has been running since March 1919 like a clock, causing no trouble, 
disappointment, delay or difficulty.”10 The operating costs of Armistice were also
reported to be well below those of a steel ship, but the building cost was very expensive. 
The first oceangoing concrete ship constructed in the United States was Faith, 
launched in May 1918 by the San Francisco Shipbuilders Company. Faith was followed 
by the concrete ships of the Emergency Fleet Corporation (E.F.C.) and other private 
companies. Faith was considered to be ‘hastily built’ but was believed to have carried 
more cargo and sailed more distance than any of the later ships. This vessel had an 
advantage when compared to other concrete ships because it was quickly built and ready 
as the demand for shipping hit its peak.
11
 Faith was built very quickly after the United
States entered World War I in April 1917 and its service took place during a time when 
any and all ships were being put into use. In comparison, other American concrete ships, 
government and private, were not ready until the war was either over, or almost over. 
Faith’s voyages included trips along the west coast of the United States, Hawaii, the east 
coast of the United States, Great Britain, the Mediterranean, and South America. It was 
9
 Jean Haviland, “American Concrete Steamers of the First and Second World Wars,” American Neptune, 
XX (July 1962), 158. 
10
 N.K. Fougner, Seagoing and other concrete ships (London, 1922), 189. 
11
 Jean Haviland, “American Concrete Steamers of the First and Second World Wars,” American Neptune, 
XX (July 1962), 165. 
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the first concrete ship to make a trans-Atlantic voyage. Faith completed its final voyage 
in 1921, unable to compete with the speed and operating costs of steel vessels. The ship 
was stripped of its machinery and sunk as a breakwater off Cuba. Faith proved that 
concrete was a shipbuilding method that could create ships effectively if they could be 
built at the right time. 
Emergency Fleet Corporation 
As World War I and German U-boat attacks began to take their toll on the ships of the 
allies, countries started to look for quick and cheap methods to replace the merchant 
ships that were being destroyed by the war. Due to a shortage of supplies, a variety of 
alternative materials were investigated to help create new ships. As Scientific American 
described it in a 1918 article, “the urgent cry for ships and more ships has compelled us 
to seek every means of supplementing the supply of older and better-known shipbuilding 
materials.”12 The United States Shipping Board (U.S.S.B.) was established by the 
Shipping Act of 1916 to resolve this problem for the U.S. This act also “gave the 
government the power to build and operate ships during the existing emergency, and up 
to five years after its conclusion.”13 When the United States entered the war in April 
1917, the United States Shipping Board created the Emergency Fleet Corporation 
(E.F.C.) to construct and acquire existing vessels. These two programs had a poor start 
with the program heads having two very different ideas on how they should be run. 
                                                 
12
 “Ships of Stone,” Scientific American, CXIX, No. 9 (August 1918), 165. 
13
 Salvatore R. Mercogliano, “The Shipping Act of 1916 and Emergency Fleet Corporation: America 
Builds, Requisitions, and Seizes a Merchant Fleet Second to None,” The Northern Mariner, XXVI, No. 4 
(October 2016), 408. 
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E.F.C. progress was further hindered by an approval process that required the agreement 
of both heads before work could be done. After this inauspicious start, both programs 
received new leaders who compromised to have a clear vision going forward. Edward 
Hurley became the new head of the United States Shipping Board. Hurley quickly 
identified five actions to provide the necessary ships: 
First, the Shipping Board would commandeer all the ships, over 2,500 tons, 
under construction in United States ports. Second, they would requisition all 
necessary ships flying the American flag. Next, they would repair, refurbish, 
and recondition the suitable captured German ships for use as troop 
transports and cargo vessels. Fourth, they would solicit neutral and allied 
states for additional tonnage, to supplement those ships requisitioned. 
Finally, the U.S.S.B. and E.F.C. would initiate a building program for wood, 
steel, concrete, and composite ships to provide 15 million tons in addition to 
the 3.5 million tons in operation when the United States declared War.
14
 
Starting in July 1917, the U.S.S.B. followed the steps identified, with diplomatic 
struggles occurring along the way. The Board quickly discovered the challenges of 
building new ships in a hurry. With all the current shipyards already in the process of 
building more ships, expansion of current yards and constructing new yards was the only 
way to produce the needed tonnage. Part of this initiative was the construction of four 
steel prefabrication yards, five concrete yards, along with a revival of wood 
construction.
15
 The concrete shipbuilding program was the last to begin as yards had to 
be built. Yards for building concrete ships were established all over the country 
including the east, west, and gulf coasts. Although there was a basic template for the 
yards to follow, shipyards were allowed to make changes as long as they did not 
                                                 
14
 Salvatore R. Mercogliano, “The Shipping Act of 1916 and Emergency Fleet Corporation: America 
Builds, Requisitions, and Seizes a Merchant Fleet Second to None,” The Northern Mariner, XXVI, No. 4 
(October 2016), 410. 
15
 Ibid, 418. 
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significantly alter the budget or timeline. This lack of standardization was likely a factor 
in the U.S.S.B. ships being quickly set aside in the post-war trade. Of the ships built, 
twelve were made of concrete. Forty-two concrete vessels were originally ordered by the 
E.F.C., but the end of the war terminated the program after only twelve of them were 
built. 
         The first two concrete ships made by the E.F.C., Atlantus and Polias, were 
experimental vessels constructed in private yards. The other concrete ships constructed 
by the E.F.C. were all produced in yards owned by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. 
The yards were designed specially for the type of ship (wood, steel or concrete), to be 
built at each location. Two basic types of concrete ships were created by the E.F.C.: 
cargo transports and oil tankers. The early ships were 3,500 dead weight tons, but this 
size was soon considered too small and the remaining ships were increased to 7,500 
tons.
16
 At Wilmington, North Carolina, the Liberty Shipbuilding Co., which built 
Atlantus, also built Cape Fear and Sapona (both of the 3,500-ton variety). The upgrade 
to the 7,500-ton ships delayed the building program for the remaining 38 ships, and thus 
most were never created.  
In Mobile, Alabama, Fred T. Lay and Co., Inc., of Boston, Massachusetts built 
Selma and Lantham. On the west coast, Pacific Marine Construction Co. built the 
Cuyamaca and San Pasqual in San Diego and the San Francisco Shipbuilding Co. 
constructed Palo Alto and Peralta in Oakland, California. Finally, in Jacksonville, 
                                                 
16
 Jean Haviland, “American Concrete Steamers of the First and Second World Wars,” American Neptune, 
XX (July 1962), 161. 
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Florida, A. Bently and Sons Co. of Toledo, Ohio built Dinsmore and Moffitt. Although 
the hulls for Dinsmore and Moffitt were finished, it is unlikely they were ever fitted with 
engines since they were not completed until 1921, well after World War I was over. It is 
important to note that while private companies were contracted to actually build the 
ships, each of these shipyards was government owned. The first of these ships (Atlantus) 
was completed in 1918 and the last (Moffitt) was completed in 1921. None of them ever 
made the contribution they were supposed to because none were ready in time. Other 
concrete ships were under construction but were sold along with the shipyards. All 
twelve of the completed ships were used to some extent after their launch for different 
purposes with varying levels of success. Some actually participated in trade, others were 
never more than floating storage tanks or breakwaters. 
         The overall success of the U.S.S.B. is a question that was raised following the 
end of the war. Senator William H. King of Utah stated his unfavorable opinion of the 
U.S.S.B., saying “the board had spent $3,700,000,000 and all it had to show for it was 
seven valueless concrete ships, 300 useless wooden ships, and 1,400 steel vessels of 
doubtful value, half of which are tied up and out of service.”17 The wooden vessels from 
the program were mostly made with green, unseasoned wood, causing them to be leaky. 
The steel vessels from the program were often of lower quality than other steel ships 
made available by the ending of the war. The concrete ships were slower and had less 
stowage capacity than steel ships of comparable size. Proponents of concrete looked at 
these vessels as a start to new methods in the future, something that could be improved 
                                                 
17
 “The Shipping Board’s Task,” The Brownsville Daily Herald, 23 June 1921. 
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upon as new techniques and mixes of concrete were created. In the end, the concrete 
ships did not achieve their potential as only twelve of the forty-two were completed 
before the end of the war. They were never tested in World War I and had no chance to 
make a difference in the shipping shortages. 
SS Selma 
Although Selma was built to help the merchant fleet in World War I, it was not launched 
until 28 June 1919. This was the same day as the signing of the Treaty of Versailles 
which formally ended the war. The front page of the Mobile News-Item had the 
announcement of the launching of Selma surrounded by articles announcing peace.
18
 
Other dates have been reported as the launch date, depending on the source it has been 
listed from as early as 20 June to as late as 30 June 1919. As noted earlier, the hull was 
built by the firm Fred T. Lay and Co., Inc. of Boston, Massachusetts in an E.F.C. 
shipyard in Mobile, Alabama. The ship was 434 feet (132.28 meters) in length and fifty-
four feet (16.46 meters) in beam. Selma was the first of the E.F.C. ships to be moved up 
to the 7,500-ton size which caused a delay in its building. This delay was only one of the 
struggles that affected the building of Selma. Contrary to the hopes of the U.S.S.B., the 
dead weight ton price for Selma was around $282 and the total hull cost was $786,754, 
which was comparable to a steel ship.
19
  
                                                 
18
 “7500-ton Steamer is Now Ready to be put Overboard with a Crowd of Over 2000 Attending,” The 
Mobile News-Item, 28 June 1919. 
19
 Jean Haviland, “American Concrete Steamers of the First and Second World Wars,” American Neptune, 
XX (July 1962), 165. 
13 
Figure 3. SS Selma being launched in Mobile, Alabama. Reprinted from Aberdeen’s Concrete 
Construction.
20
 
Selma was the largest ship to be launched sideways on the Gulf Coast (Figure 3), and 
some spectators questioned how the ship would handle it.
21
 Their worries were
unnecessary as Selma was launched without issue. 
After outfitting, the ship was employed as an oil tanker. It set out in April 1920 on 
a “smooth as glass seas” on its maiden voyage to Tampico, Mexico. After arriving it 
loaded a cargo of 38,000 barrels of crude oil to deliver to the United States. Because of 
heavy traffic in the area, on 16 May, Selma moved out of the port and anchored just 
20
 R.W. Steiger, “Going to Sea in Concrete,” Aberdeen’s Concrete Construction, XXXVII, No. 6 (June 
1992), 472. 
21
 “7500-ton Steamer is Now Ready to be put Overboard with a Crowd of Over 2000 Attending,” The 
Mobile News-Item, 28 June 1919. 
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outside the jetties at the mouth of the Panuco River. This area was considered extremely 
hazardous as it had conflicting currents from the river and the Gulf of Mexico. Not only 
were the currents dangerous, the jetties themselves were not well maintained, and were 
described as “in several places submerged and scattered over the floor of the entrance to 
the harbor.”  
 
 
 
Figure 4. View of Selma stranded on the Tampico jetty from the deck of the SS John D. Rockefeller. 
Reprinted with permission from The Mariners’ Museum.22  
 
 
When Selma raised anchor in rough weather on 17 May to complete loading, the currents 
pushed it onto the jetty near another vessel that had been stuck on the jetty for over six 
months (Figure 4). The Galveston Daily News described the aftermath of the wrecking: 
                                                 
22
 The Mariners' Museum, photography collection, APB1 V71, 29 November 2018. 
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Effort to back off the jetty proved unsuccessful, and the grinding of the rocks 
against the forepart of the hull of the vessel soon tore a sixty-foot [18.28 
meters] hole in the bottom from the sixteen-foot [4.88 meter] waterline 
down. The forward deck was awash, and where soundings were taken about 
two minutes after the vessel ran on the rocks the forepeak tank had filled 
with water, and ten minutes after striking, the dry cargo holds forward of the 
bridge had filled. With her bottom ripped out, she lay on the rocks while the 
seas, continually washing over her as far as No. 2 tank, sprayed her 
superstructure, masts, etc. with the oil set adrift from the front cargo 
compartments. All the cargo except about 14,000 barrels stowed in the after 
tanks was liberated.
23
 
Tampico was a common place for ships to wreck. Besides the ship stranded on the jetty 
when Selma wrecked, its sister ship, Lantham, also ran into a jetty at Tampico on 15 July 
1919.
24
  
To get Selma back to the United States, compressed air was continuously 
pumped into the forward cargo space. Since the bottom of the hull in this area was 
missing, heavy timbers were attached to side of the vessel. “Immense A frames of heavy 
wooden spars were built, and these were placed at about fifteen-foot [4.57 meter] 
intervals along the top of the deck [Figure 5].
25
  
                                                 
23
 “Coming from Rocks at Mouth of Tampico Harbor, the First Concrete Ship Enters Port,” The Galveston 
Daily News, 29 August 1920. 
24
 “Repairs to Bottom Stand Test, Engineers Says,” The Galveston Daily News, 20 October, 1920. 
25
 “Coming from Rocks at Mouth of Tampico Harbor, the First Concrete Ship Enters Port,” The Galveston 
Daily News, 29 August 1920. 
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Figure 5. Reinforcing timbers on Selma to allow it to be sailed to Galveston. Reprinted with permission 
from The Mariners’ Museum.26 
 
 
These were secured to the timbers on the side of Selma, the ship was sailed to the United 
States. Selma reached Galveston, Texas for repairs on 15 August 1920. The vessel 
returned under its own power, running both the engines and generators non-stop. It was 
reported that the paint in the engine room was burned off from the heat. For this trip to 
                                                 
26
 The Mariners' Museum, photography collection, APB1 V71, 29 November 2018. 
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Galveston, Selma did not have a full crew of forty-three men but instead had a skeleton 
crew (only three of whom were on board when it hit the jetty). Most notable of this crew 
was First Officer E.R. Dibel. According to the Galveston Daily News, Dibel 
was serving as a member of the naval intelligence department in the shipyard 
where the Selma was built and saw the keel of the ship laid…he was asked 
to occupy an officer’s berth on the tanker and because he had seen her in the 
course of her building and because his curiosity was aroused over the 
possibility of sailing on a concrete vessel, he accepted, and, as he says now 
‘has been with her through all of her troubles.’27 
Selma’s entry into Galveston was followed by the sister ship, Lantham a few days later. 
Repairs were expected to happen in that order, but none of the Galveston shipyards had 
ever seen or dealt with a concrete ship before, let alone two requiring repairs.  The 
American expert in concrete shipbuilding, Walter R. Harper, was sent to Galveston to 
oversee the repairs. Harper needed to remove the broken concrete, straighten the 
reinforcing steel, and get the new concrete to bond with the old while also keeping the 
contour lines.
28
  
In October 1920, Selma was advertised for sale, with the requirement that bids 
include $38,000 for the repair materials already shipped to Galveston.
29
 The request for 
bids was still open in December of the same year, but no longer required covering the 
repair costs. This later advertisement included Latham, describing its condition as “has 
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just completed alterations designed for its betterment and is ready for immediate 
delivery.”30 Lantham’s repairs had been completed by October.
Although materials were shipped to Galveston, Selma was never actually 
repaired. A report on Selma stated that restoring the vessel to seaworthy condition 
“seemed to be impracticable. It was too badly damaged to make it serviceable again and 
too costly to break up.”31 A major part of the problem was the reinforcing steel jutting
from the damaged area of the hull, to the extent that there was no smooth surface for the 
ship to sit on during its time in dry dock. While awaiting repairs or a buyer at Pier 10, 
the ship sank in the dock.
32
 Removing the ship from here was the first step in what
became a prolonged scuttling process. Compressors were employed to keep air pressure 
in the hold and raise the vessel from the mud. In most ships, the engine equipment and 
other items would be taken out and salvaged, but it was “not considered likely that much 
of the Selma’s engines or other machinery will be salvaged. The major items of the 
engine room are set in the concrete from which the hull is cast.”33 The expense of
recovering the engines could not be recouped, so the preparation of the hull for 
abandonment focused on easily removed items such as furnishings, planking and 
electrical fittings. Prior to raising the ship one last time to move and scuttle, a permanent 
location first had to be chosen. Different areas were considered, including outside the 
south jetty, or moving the ship to another port entirely, but the location ultimately 
30
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chosen was Pelican Flats - a shallow area near Pelican Island. A 1500 foot (457 meter) 
long and 25 feet (7.62 meter) deep channel was dredged to ensure Selma was far enough 
from the main channel to not impede shipping traffic.
34
 Selma refloated and then scuttled 
in this location on 10 March 1922. 
The many newspaper and journal articles written about the early days of Selma, 
contain numerous errors and omissions. One area of discrepancies is the question of how 
long Selma was in service. Some articles say the Tampico wrecking was on the maiden 
voyage, while others say Selma had a few successful trips, and still others say it was in 
use for three years before sinking. Based on the known dates of major events, it is clear 
Selma wrecked in its first year. The launch was in June 1919 and it arrived in Galveston 
for repairs on 15 August 1920 after the May wrecking, so the ship was in service for less 
than a year. A few trips may have been made, but an article from The Galveston Daily 
News, dated 29 August 1920, describes the wreck as occurring on the maiden voyage.
35
 
Regardless of which voyage saw Selma meet its end, the results remain the same, a 
shallow water grave in Galveston Bay. 
         Far from the ship’s history being over following the abandonment, the story of 
Selma was just beginning. When plans for scuttling and abandonment where first coming 
out, newspapers reported that the hull might be turned into a “pleasure pier” as 
Galveston had given a proposal to the U.S.S.B. once it became clear the previous plans 
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for repairing or breaking up the ship were too expensive.
36
 The “pleasure pier” plan was 
never implemented. Instead, after the scuttling, Selma was sold by the US Shipping 
Board for $1000 to J.E. Peterson and J.L. Bludworth. With most of the ship still above 
the water, it was reported the buyers planned to convert the hull into a fishing resort. 
Peterson subsequently bought out Bludworth for $500, then he eventually sold it to 
Henry G. Dalehite in 1929. Unfortunately, not everyone was happy about the addition of 
Selma to the Galveston waterfront. In 1928, while the hulk was being used by the Oil 
Exploration Company as a base of operations and storage for prospecting work, an 
article in The Galveston Daily News stated that Selma “is an eyesore and distinctly a bad 
advertisement for the city” and suggested that “an organized effort to blow her up should 
be made.”37 The prominent location alongside the ship channel, clearly visible on the 
ferry route and from the most eastern end of the seawall, ensured that a large number of 
people saw the hulk. 
         In July 1928, a reward was placed in the newspaper by J.E. Peterson “for 
information leading to the arrest of persons destroying deckhouses on concrete ship 
Selma.”38 No information was given in the papers as to whether the vandals were ever 
caught. As successive post-scuttling ventures failed to work out or even start, Selma 
became a repository of sorts. During Prohibition, U.S. Customs officers broke 2,000 
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cases of liquor on the deck, disposing of the illegal liquor through the scuppers and 
tossing the broken bottles into the hull.
39
 
Selma changed hands again, bought by Clesmey ‘Frenchy’ LeBlanc in 1946 for 
100 dollars from Henry Dalehite. Frenchy moved out to the vessel and quickly became 
one of its most fantastical stories. While using the vessel as his home he “never bothered 
about taxes, food, high rent, women or many of the other perplexing problems that 
harass the mind of the average man in modern civilization.”40 One of the most notable 
events that happened during LeBlanc’s sojourn on the ship was the First National 
Convention of the Happy Hermits, Inc. It was open to anyone who wanted to participate 
and took place out on the ship. Planned by representatives from Fox Movietone and 
Universal News, the hermits were provided with signs with slogans such as “we want 
women members” and “Civilization? We’ll stay in Galveston Channel.”41 During his 
time on the ship, LeBlanc even brought along some chickens and a goat, and only moved 
off the ship when failing health forced him to find lodging ashore. 
Continuing the tradition of using Selma as a dumping ground for illegal 
diversions, in 1957 Texas Rangers dumped 2,000 slot machines alongside the hull after 
the shutdown of the Maceo family gambling parlors. Supposedly, in the days directly 
following the dumping by the Rangers, people called in reports of the slot machines 
floating in the Galveston and Houston Shipping Channels (this was later proved to be 
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false). An effort was made by treasure hunter Carroll Lewis in 1994 to recover the slot 
machines (which he valued to around $3 million based on a value of $1,500 each). He 
was not expecting to find money in the slot machines but based the value strictly on the 
machines themselves.
42
 Lewis clearly underestimated the effects of salt-water corrosion 
on delicate mechanisms. No follow up article has been found to indicate if the slot 
machines were ever located and recovered.
43
 
After Frenchy LeBlanc sold Selma, the deteriorating hull went through multiple 
owners before being before being bought by a man who was fascinated by its history. 
Pat A. Daniels was part of the Historical Association of Houston when the opportunity to 
purchase Selma arose in 1992. Daniels acquired Selma and created the Pat A. Daniels 
and Selma LLC to help distance him from any liability related to ownership of the 
decaying structure. He also invited his friend William Cox to buy shares and become a 
partial owner. Daniels fought for recognition of Selma on both the state and national 
level and his efforts were rewarded in 1993 with Selma being recognized with a state of 
Texas Historical Marker, and in 1994, when the hull was added to the National Register 
of Historic Places. Selma was also given the honor in 1993 of being named the flagship 
of a ceremonial commemorative group, the Texas Army. Daniels passed his love of 
Selma on to friends, and a yearly birthday celebration for Selma is now held in 
Galveston by the SS Selma Association. Although Daniels died in 2011, the celebration 
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is still taking place, with the latest occurring on 19 May 2018. A 100-year anniversary 
party is planned for May 2019. The event is now hosted by current owners Ken and 
Bonnie Cox, who inherited Selma from Ken’s father, William Cox. 
 
Other Concrete Ships and Shipwrecks 
About 170 miles (273 kilometers) southwest of Galveston, in Aransas Pass, 
Texas, a private shipyard was built by the France and Canada Oil Transport Company in 
1918. The company decided to make experimental oil tankers based on a new design 
created by R.A. Durham and commonly referred to as a ‘whale backed tanker’. The 
unusual hulls were based on the theory that, because they were built out of concrete, 
many of the ship design considerations that might apply to other materials did not apply 
to them. The ships were made of two large cylindrical tubes connected in Venn diagram 
fashion (Figure 6). Concrete slabs connected the two cylinders on the top to make the 
deck, and below to make the bottom of the ship. When under construction they were 
described as resembling “nothing so much as silos, or small concrete grain elevators, 
similar to those seen at flour mills and were often mistaken for such when viewed from 
the harbor some little distance away.”44 The ships were 2,000 tons, had a length of 298 
feet (90.83 meters) and a beam of 33 feet 9 inches (10.29 meters). The vessels were 
made by the McDonald Engineering Corporation with the aid of a government subsidy 
during World War I to help replenish the fleet of available ships. Beyond their 
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interesting construction, these ships were also a boon for the community as the shipyard 
brought employment to the area. The company complained “that unless something was 
done to house the families of the 600 workmen that they would lose them as 
employment was so plentiful all over the country.
45
 The ships were named after two 
company officers. Durham was launched on 24 July 1920, and Darlington was launched 
15 November 1920.
46
  
 
 
Figure 6. Hull portion of SS Durham or Darlington. Reprinted from Scientific American.
47
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These ships were originally designed to trade between Tampico, Mexico and Port 
Aransas carrying oil, but after one trip Durham was “proven unsatisfactory as to 
seaworthiness.”48 W.A. Schrivner worked at the shipyard in Aransas Pass, and in the
1970s shared his experiences with The Aransas Pass Progress, including a description of 
the first trip of what he remembered to be Darlington. One of the crew, H.L. “Sleepy” 
Bedwell gave this account of the voyage to his friend W.A. Schrivner: 
He said that the gulf was not rough at all, but on account of the round shape 
of the ship and with so little keel to it, the ship simply wallowed around and 
was very unwieldy, making the time for the trip about three times [longer 
than] what another steel tanker would take. “Sleepy” said it was impossible 
to steer the ship past the jetties protecting the harbor, and the bow simply 
nosed onto the rocks and subsequent waves pushed it farther up. The crew 
was lucky to get off without injury.
49
It is important to note that this account may have been exaggerated over time as it was 
recorded around fifty years after the events occurred and was a second-hand account. 
Another account by Bedwell, this time in a letter to Galveston newspaper reporter Alan 
Castleschouldt, gives a slightly different version of events: 
In the early 20’s a company called The France and Canada Steamship 
Company came to Aransas Pass to build two experimental concrete ships… 
They bought three ocean-going tow-boats. One of these tugs attempted to 
take an oil barge out into the jetties and sunk about a mile south of the south 
jetty.  
I was working in the machine shop as a machinist helper while these boats 
were being built. They finally got the Durham fitted out. She was powered 
by a 160 H.P. diesel motor which was about one third of the power that was 
needed. The machine foreman knew I had quite a bit of oilfield experience 
firing oilfield boilers. One day he came to me and said ‘come with me’. We 
went over the Durham and he told the chief engineer that I was taking charge 
48
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of the boiler room. There was no one there who knew anything about boilers 
so I got along fine.  
After so many days we finally went to sea. The ship was almost round—no 
keel. It rolled so much the sailors had to tie themselves down in order to stay 
in bed. It was 360 miles from the bar at Port Aransas to the bar at Tampico. 
We must have covered 450 miles to get there on account of not having 
enough power to steer. When we got in the Panuco River in Tampico there 
was a 5-6 knot current in the river so we laid in the river until they sent a tug 
from Port Aransas to dock us. After we loaded and got back out to sea that 
ship was as sluggish as a water-logged tree, no movement whatsoever. I was 
discharged the morning after we docked at Port Aransas. I heard later they 
had made a barge of her. Her sister ship was named Darlington. She never 
went outside until they attempted to tow her to Galveston. I was told she 
broke the towline. She went on the beach at the north end of Matagorda 
Island. I do not know why Durham was sunk at Bolivar Roads.
50
  
There are some discrepancies between the two accounts. The first difference in the 
Bedwell-Schrivner account is that it says Darlington went on the voyage and Durham 
was never finished. In fact, according to newspaper accounts at the time, Durham was 
the only one to attempt a voyage to Tampico and Darlington was never finished. 
Therefore, in this account the Bedwell letter was correct. The other discrepancy with the 
Bedwell-Schrivner account is that it states that the vessel was never recovered and “as I 
heard…it was finally pounded to pieces on the jetties.”51 Both Darlington and Durham 
were sold and had final resting places far from Aransas Pass as stated in the later 
Bedwell letter and confirmed by newspapers, but as stated in the beginning of the 
Bedwell letter, there was a tug that was sunk on the jetties. The variances between the 
two accounts can probably be explained by one being a firsthand memory while the 
other is a secondhand memory. Both versions agree that the ships were not good sailors.   
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         Durham and Darlington were sold along with three barges and two steel tugs in 
an auction on 11 March 1922 to settle a lien.
52
 Both of the ships were bought by the 
Callahan-Atkinson Company out of New York along with two of the barges for $5000.
53
 
On 16 June 1922 they were in tow from Port Aransas to Beaumont, Texas (along with a 
barge), when a squall came up. The line parted between Durham, the first in the line of 
ships being towed, and Darlington, the second. There were no men aboard Darlington, 
only in the third vessel, the barge. Men aboard the barge set an anchor and tried to keep 
the two ships steady, but the line between Darlington and the barge also parted. 
Darlington quickly ran aground.
54
 Darlington was never fully finished after the failure 
of Durham’s first trip, and the company’s plan for the two concrete vessels was “to tie 
them up in the river above Beaumont for the time being hoping ultimately to dispose of 
them in some manner.”55 Not surprisingly, the grounded Darlington was never recovered 
by its new owners. It can still be found in Matagorda Bay, near Corpus Christi where it 
sank in 1922. While the hull is not as visible in the water as Selma, it has been spotted 
during low tides. Darlington is still a fixture in the fishing community and appears on 
message boards as a good fishing spot.  
Following the ill-fated tow to Beaumont, Durham was tied in the river near a 
drawbridge type railroad bridge owned by the Kansas City Southern Railroad Company. 
In 1924, the railroad company tried to have Durham moved from the area due to the 
                                                 
52
 “Tugs and Barges to be Sold Here on Saturday,” The Galveston Daily News, 10 March 1922. 
53
 “Concrete Tanker Strands on Beach: Uncompleted Vessel from Port Aransas Aground at Pass Cavallo,” 
The Galveston Daily News, 21 June 1922. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Ibid. 
 28 
 
navigational risk it created. Their claim stated that if the Neches River rose high enough 
and Durham broke free, it would run into the railroad bridge. In order to force the 
owners to move their hulk, Kansas City Southern had to show proof that Durham posed 
a menace to navigation.
56
 While there was no reported verdict in the case, it is clear that 
Kansas City Southern was unsuccessful, for on 28 February 1932, the Port Arthur News 
reported a collision between Durham and a tug with a barge just upriver of the railroad 
bridge. The bridge was delayed in rising for the oncoming tug because a train was 
coming, and when the tug with the barge lost their headway they drifted into Durham.
57
 
No damage was reported. It is never stated what Durham was used for, but not long after 
this accident it was moved again. 
The Del Rio Evening News from 26 March 1935 related that Durham was 
purchased to use as a chemical plant by the Seaboard Tankers Corporation and the 
Seaboard Oil Company of Houston for “one-fiftieth of her original cost to the 
government.”58 It is after this that the history of Durham becomes murkier. The last 
mention in newspapers is in September 1935 when the El Paso Herald-Post reported the 
hull was moved that month to Galveston, to be placed alongside Pelican Spit and used 
for storage purposes by the oil company.
59
 A 1984 issue of In Between Magazine (a 
defunct Galveston magazine), reported that William D. McMillian Sr. obtained the rights 
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to Durham in 1936 and had it towed to Galveston for use as a fishing pier. Called 
Sportsman’s Pier, it was in business until it was destroyed by a hurricane.60 Another 
article in the same magazine described its final resting place as “near the North Jetty of 
Point Bolivar.”61 Sportsman’s Pier is mentioned in The Galveston Daily News multiple 
times from 1937 to 1940, but no article could be found on the opening and subsequent 
destruction of Sportsman’s Pier, or the final resting place of Durham.  
Although there is not a recorded final location for Durham in Galveston, there is 
also no record of the ship ever leaving the area. It would also have been difficult to move 
Durham if it was sunk for use as a fishing pier. This makes the Galveston area the likely 
location of the shipwreck, and considering there are two unidentified concrete 
shipwrecks in the area this possibility is increased.   
 
 
 
Figure 7. Concrete wreck off Bolivar peninsula. Reprinted with permission of Corpus Christi Public 
Libraries.
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There is evidence to support both of the unidentified shipwrecks as Durham. 
Photos of the smaller unidentified concrete wreck off Bolivar Flats, labeled as the 
Durham, can be found at the Corpus Christi Public Library. The construction of this ship 
does appear to match the construction of the ships built at Aransas Pass. However, 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Concrete wreck off the north jetty. Reprinted with permission of Corpus Christi Public Libraries. 
63 
 
at around 100 feet (30.48 meters) long, the length of this wreck is slightly over a third of 
the known length of the vessels built at Aransas Pass, so it is possible this is only a 
portion of the ship. It is important to note that these pictures do not have any 
provenience or date associated with them.   
The second unidentified wreck at the end of the north jetty is in the correct 
position for Durham. It is also shown in photos at the Corpus Christi Public Library 
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(Figure 8), but they are labeled Darlington. Since Darlington wrecked off Matagorda 
Island in an area with no jetties, the label is clearly incorrect. The photo being labeled as 
Darlington may point to this ship also being of the whale-backed construction. This 
wreck is recorded on the 1940 NOAA charts, which eliminates the many barges that 
were later wrecked on the jetty. This second wreck might also be Durham. While an 
exact length has not been recorded, a rough estimate from a Google Earth satellite image 
shows that it is about 213 feet (64.92 meters) in length - very close to two-thirds of 
Durham’s full length. This could point to both of these wrecks being Durham in two 
pieces. The question then becomes how the sections ended up over two nautical miles 
(185.2 km) apart.  
Conclusion 
The struggles of World War I created an environment where concrete ships 
became desirable and practical. The end of the war and the surplus of merchant ships 
changed theses imperatives, and concrete ships ceased to be built. The few ships that 
were completed were briefly used in various trades until they were accidently sunk or 
intentionally scuttled. The post-war abundance of steel vessels meant that slower, harder 
to build, and less efficient concrete vessels became disadvantageous. Concrete never 
reached its potential as a building material that was touted in the early and enthusiastic 
predictions. This manner of building was ignored until World War II created another 
sudden demand for ships. The two World War I ships off of Galveston were scuttled for 
different reasons that both equaled a lack of usefulness. Selma was too complicated and 
32 
expensive to fix, while the second one (most likely Durham) was scuttled because it 
performed poorly as a tanker vessel. 
The eventful post-sinking careers of these ships is probably the most surprising 
aspect of their history. Far from disappearing from view, both hulls became popular 
fishing spots after they sank. For Selma, scuttling was the beginning of a wide range of 
stories and legends that captured the imaginations of people over the years. The vessel’s 
presence in Galveston has made it a cultural and historical landmark. The less-visible 
Durham does not have the same Galveston legends attached to it but has still managed to 
make an impact on the local fishing community. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONSTRUCTION OF WORLD WAR I CONCRETE SHIPS 
Construction of Earliest Concrete Vessels 
The first ferrocement rowboat was built in France by Joseph Louis Lambot in 
1848.  To create the desired shape, Lambot made a frame of iron bars covered with a 
layer of wire mesh.
64
 The basic construction of the concrete rowboat was later modified
in many ways to create increasingly larger vessels, culminating in the oceangoing ships 
of World War I. 
The two most important aspects of a concrete hull are the inner framework and 
the concrete itself. The concrete must be made of aggregates that ensure the hull is 
waterproof when the vessel dries. Along with the types of particles, the amount of water 
used in mixing the concrete also played an important role that was not realized until 
later. Early ferrocement builders were unaware that the strength and durability of 
mortars was significantly reduced by increasing the water content. Luckily, the mortar 
could easily be worked into the mesh with a small amount of water being added. 
Another critical aspect of concrete mix was the size of the different aggregates. This idea 
was better understood, and a size of below approximately 3mm was identified as 
necessary to allow for the correct penetration and compaction.
65
 Lambot’s boat was the
first, but almost forty years later, other boat builders started using concrete. The ideal 
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water-cement ratio was not fully developed until much later, and when the World War I 
concrete ships were built the recognition that the ratio of water to cement changed the 
quality of the final product was just taking hold.
66
In 1887, the first reinforced-concrete barge was built in Holland. The early 
“reinforced” vessels of this type relied on a frame consisting only of steel bars. The lack 
of expanded mesh in the internal reinforcement made them more prone to cracking and 
more likely to develop large cracks at lower load levels. Ferrocement was preferred in 
many cases since reinforced concrete had a lower tolerance for stresses and cracking. 
Once cracks opened, the interior reinforcement was susceptible to corrosion.
67
 From
Holland, the use of concrete barges spread through many western European countries in 
the early years of the 20
th
-century.
It was in Norway in 1917 that the first seagoing concrete ship was built, a 200-
ton vessel intended to carry cargos between Norway and England. The designer, N.K. 
Fougner, had experience building concrete lighters at Manila in the Philippine Islands, 
and in 1912 filed his first patents in the United Kingdom for a seagoing concrete ship. It 
was not until 1916, however that Fougner took the plans for one of his ships to the 
Norwegian Department of Shipping for approval. The government stalled, granting a 
permit but noting that its “naval architects, concrete engineers, and sailors expressed 
their unreserved opinions…that the whole idea was impossible and that a seagoing 
66
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concrete ship was doomed to disaster the first time she encountered rough weather.”68
After failing to secure outside support, Fougner used his own company to pay for 
building Namsenfjord. The vessel had an overall length of eighty-four feet (25.6 meters) 
with a breadth of twenty feet (6.1 meters) and (as noted above) a cargo capacity of about 
200 tons. For propulsion, it was outfitted with a Bolinder crude oil engine capable of 80 
horsepower with a designed speed of 7 ½ miles per hour (12.07 kilometers per hour). 
The construction of Namsenfjord was unique, for instead of having a wooden 
form it was built using a perforated metal lath for most of the large sections. Wood 
centering was used for the frames and deck beams, and wooden boxes for frames and 
beams helped to stiffen and support the metal lath. For the main structural support there 
was metal mesh by each portion of vertical plating with reinforcing rods tied to the 
mesh. The concrete was poured between the mesh and vertical plating. It was finished 
with a cement mortar on the two surfaces.
69
 All of the steel reinforcement for the hull
and deck was in place before the concrete was poured. Internal walls and bulkheads were 
constructed afterwards by metal mesh with round bars serving as additional horizontal 
and vertical reinforcements that were then plastered with concrete mortar. 
One of the biggest areas of concern when building the ship was the engine 
foundations along with the sternpost and rudder. How the ship would react to the stress 
of vibrations from the engine influenced the design of these elements. It was believed 
that a concrete hull would distribute less of the engine vibration than a steel hull and 
68
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localize areas of stress on the hull. If this had not been incorrect, the result could have 
been devastating due. To help combat this possible problem, a foundation made of two 
heavy girders running parallel to the centerline and connected to five transverse frames 
was created to distribute the engine vibrations over both the frames and bottom slab. For 
the sternpost, a concrete internal post was included when building the hull. A wrought-
iron post with the structural hardware needed for the propeller and rudder was secured to 
the sternpost with seventeen anchor bolts. This post was further supported with eight 
inch (20.32 centimeter) wide steel plates used to enclose the end of the concrete.
70
 Both
of these design features were found to be successful for the operational lifetime of the 
vessel. 
Other materials were employed, for the finishing features. Wood was used for the 
deckhouses and many other internal structures, such as the oak used for the fenders and 
bilge keels. Steel beams were used to protect the hatch coamings from chipping. Finally, 
a 5-horsepower winch and other standard equipment for similar merchant vessels were 
fitted. Following the addition of these components, the ship was ready to be launched. 
After two failed attempts to get it off the ways, a floating crane was brought in and 
Namsenfjord finally reached the water 2 August 1917. The launch was followed by the 
installation of machinery and a round of sea trials. These were deemed to be successful 
and by the end of the month the ship loaded its first cargo. 
This early concrete hulled-merchant ship was considered a success but had 
design issues that affected how future concrete ships were built. The first 
70
 N.K. Fougner, Seagoing and other concrete ships (London, 1922), 14. 
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recommendation was for wooden deckhouses to have concrete walls to ensure a proper 
joint. Another recommendation was for the main hatch to have rounded corners: squared 
corners were to be avoided in the concrete construction to avoid introducing stress 
concentrations. The double mesh walls were seen as being overbuilt and only one layer 
of mesh recommended for future ships. Another design feature that was deemed to be an 
overdesign was the double bottom, as it added weight and interfered with inspections 
and piping. 
The most important feature to be addressed in future ships was the inclusion of 
gravel in the concrete. It was a desirable addition to the mix for level areas where 
concrete would be poured, as concrete with gravel was cheaper and may have been less 
prone to cracking, but in vertical areas, it was found to cause problems with the mortar 
attaching to the reinforcement. Namsenfjord was the start of larger, seagoing concrete 
ships, and the lessons learned during its construction and sea trials were used to improve 
subsequent vessels. N.K. Fougner constructed four more concrete vessels in Norway 
after the success of this venture and also advised the U.S.S.B. on the E.F.C. concrete 
ships. 
The earliest concrete ship in the United States, Faith, was built in 1918 by a 
private company, the San Francisco Shipbuilding Co., in Redwood City, California. 
When it was completed, it was the largest concrete ship in the world with a length of 320 
feet (97.54 meters) and a breadth of forty-four feet, six inches (13.56 meters). Faith had 
a registered capacity of 4,500 tons though the hull was designed to carry 5,000 tons. It 
was a screw steamer with triple expansion engines that produced 1,700 horsepower and 
38 
a top speed of around ten knots (18.5 kilometers per hour). Faith was launched six 
weeks after San Francisco Shipbuilding started pouring concrete. This quick completion 
gave credence to the idea that if a there was a design and shipyards to build them, then 
concrete ships could be the answer to any shortages of merchant vessels. For its 
construction, heavy transverse frames had a spacing of sixteen feet (4.88 meters) with 
longitudinal framing. To help ensure the strongest bond between the concrete and steel, 
deformed bars with projections were used. There were seven watertight concrete 
bulkheads. The thickness of the concrete ranged from four to four and a half inches 
(10.16 to 11.43cm) on the sides and bottom and three to three and a half inches (7.62 to 
8.89cm) on the shelter deck. Not all of the ship was concrete as the main, poop, bridge, 
and forecastle decks, and ceiling planking in the cargo holds were all constructed from 
wood.
71
 Faith ended up costing $750,000, well above the original estimate of $300,000
to $400,000. 
Although the budget was a disappointment, Faith performed well in other areas. 
The hull was watertight with no sweating in the holds, and “in rough seas…exhibited the 
easy movements and lack of machinery vibration which are characteristic of concrete 
ships.”72 Perhaps most importantly, Faith traded for many years successfully and was
the first concrete ship to cross the Atlantic. 
Construction of the Emergency Fleet Corporation 
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The vessels of the Emergency Fleet Corporation (E.F.C.) were started with the building 
of two experimental vessels, Polias and Atlantus. Both were built in private yards by two 
different companies. The other ten concrete ships built by the E.F.C. were built in five 
Figure 9. Design of 7,500 ton concrete tankers. Reprinted from Society of Naval Architects and Marine 
Engineers.
73 
government owned shipyards by companies contracted for the work, though the original 
goal was for each of the shipyards to produce eight ships. Each yard was given the same 
set of guidelines for building the ships, but also give autonomy to modify how the ship 
was built and what materials were used as long as it did not cause too much of a 
schedule delay or price increase.  The hulls were originally designed to be 3,500-ton 
ships, but after building the first two, it was determined this design was too small to be 
73
 R.J. Wig, Esq., “Method of Construction of Concrete Ships,” Society of Naval Architects and Marine 
Engineers, XXVII (November 1919), 8. 
Construction of the Emergency Fleet Corporation 
 40 
 
practical. It was determined that the rest of the ships would be built to a 7,500-ton 
deadweight capacity.  
  Two designs were used, one for a cargo ship and the other for an oil tanker. The 
order of the construction process is not exact because different stages often overlapped 
and the availability or lack of required materials determined the sequence.
74
 The basic 
building process, not accounting for the differences of each yard, was as follows:  
1. The supports for the forms are constructed followed by the erection of the outer 
form. 
2. Steel inserts (i.e. pipes, stem plate) that need to be in place before the concrete is 
poured are secured to the forms. 
3. Reinforcing steel for the hull and frames is assembled in the outer forms along 
with the splice bar connecting the hull and bulkheads. 
4. The inner form is built to four or five feet (1.22 or 1.52 meters) and concrete is 
poured to the top of the inner form. 
5. The inside form is removed and the top surface of the concrete is prepared for the 
next pour. 
6. This basic process with adjustments is repeated for the rest of the ship until the 
concrete is all in place.  
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7. The inner and outer forms are removed and the concrete is cleaned. It is then 
tested up to the draught line & patching is done as needed. After all the issues are 
resolved the hull is painted. 
8. The ship is launched.75 
Since each shipyard had some degree of autonomy on how they built the ships 
many of the techniques of the building process varied.  
Forms for concrete ships were required to be more exacting than regular concrete 
forms since an irregularity could affect the safety and cost of a ship. The design tried to 
limit the weight of the hull while still being able to contain the steel reinforcements and 
meet the requirements for strength and capacity. Extra weight, inadequate cover and/or 
space for the steel, and nonuniform surfaces were all problems that could be created by 
poorly prepared forms.
76
 The outside forms were supported by scaffolding of wooden 
trestles at regular intervals. To ensure that the forms were aligned to create the correct 
hull lines, frame templates were made in combination with prefabricated panels. The 
preferred wood for the outside form in eastern shipyards was cypress because it was 
unlikely to warp when exposed to the elements for long periods of time. One crucial 
feature of the forms was how well they stayed in position. To ensure the outer form 
would not move with the vibrations of the air hammer, outer forms were bolted to the 
inner form or by tying both inner and outer forms to the reinforcing steel.  
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Another challenging aspect when pouring the concrete was to account for all the 
inserts. The inserts were all of the metal fittings that needed to be secured in position 
before the concrete was added.
77
 The necessary fittings varied greatly in size from small 
inserts for items like anchor bolts and pipe sleeves to large inserts for the stern post and 
stem plate. The inserts were usually placed on the forms immediately after they were 
built, before the reinforcing steel was attached. This strategy did not always work as 
many of the cast items such as bollards were not drilled precisely, so anchor bolts did not 
match the corresponding holes on the cast items.
78
 Luckily this problem was easily 
solved as holes could easily be drilled into the concrete.  
 The use of structural high-grade steel was originally planned for these ships, but 
due to wartime demand for premiums steel, there was not enough available. Instead, the 
reinforcing steel was made from the discarded croppings of shell ingots. This variety of 
steel is much harder than structural grade steel with a yield point of about 60,000 pounds 
per square inch (413,685,420 Pa) being about 10,000 pounds per square inch 
(68,947,570 Pa) more than structural grade steel. The ultimate tensile strength of the 
reinforcing steel was about 95,000 pounds per square inch (655,001,915 Pa), which was 
15,000 pounds per square inch (103,421,355 Pa) more than the structural grade steel. 
This steel was harder to bend into the necessary shape, and for every 7,500-ton concrete 
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ship, approximately 1,600 short tons were used. The steel was made into round bars 
ranging from 3/8 inch (0.95 cm) to 1 3/8 (3.49 cm) inches diameter.
79
  
 A few concrete ships were end launched, including Faith, but with the ships 
becoming much larger, there was concern for how much strain the concrete could take. 
To avoid the possibility of crippling a brand-new ship, it was determined that sideways 
launches were the best course of action. 
Under normal circumstances a ship lying in the water is supported uniformly 
at all points; even when the water is moderately rough the condition is 
seldom departed from materially. But as she stands on the ways before 
launching, she is supported only at isolated points, and her hull must be rigid 
enough to bridge the gaps between these points without suffering permanent 
deflection…If we are building a concrete ship just as a sort of engineering 
pastime…we can afford to determine its resistance to vertical distortion by 
trying to break it or bend it; if we succeed in doing either we have proved 
something…as a business proposition, we cannot afford to satisfy our 
curiosity by this empirical process of subjecting them to strains which they 
will never again be called upon to meet, simply for the sake of knowing 
whether we can break them in two by trying hard enough.
80
 
 The ships created by the E.F.C. had a mixed success rate. Most were completed 
after the war was over, so there was an overabundance of ships, making concrete an 
unpopular option. Steel ships were faster, often carried more cargo, and there were a 
large number of them available. Another factor working against these particular concrete 
ships is the suspicion that they were overbuilt, and that with slight adjustments a huge 
amount of materials and money could have been saved. One area where this was 
probably true was in the framing. If a five-foot (1.52m) spacing had been used instead of 
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a four-foot (1.22m) spacing, the ships would have been about 400 tons lighter.
81
 Along 
with reducing the weight of the concrete, less reinforcing steel would have been needed. 
Both reductions would have increased the deadweight carrying capacity. 
  There were benefits, though less tangible, derived from the E.F.C. program, 
namely that the ships made huge advances in concrete shipbuilding and in the use of 
concrete itself. The ships actually engaged in cargo shipping performed well, and there 
were even successful repairs made to one, proving that repairs were a viable option for 
concrete ships. Additionally, concrete ship hulls did make excellent if expensive floating 
storage tanks or breakwaters. E.F.C. concrete ships served in both of these capacities 
following World War I. 
Construction of the Selma 
Selma was one of the products of the E.F.C. concrete ship program, and was the 
first one built in the larger size: instead of a 3,500-ton vessel like the previous ones, it 
was decided to build a vessel of 7,500 tons. She was 434 feet (132.28m) long with a 
beam of fifty-four feet (16.46m) and a loaded displacement of 13,000 tons. Selma was 
powered by a 2,800-horsepower triple expansion engine that gave it a top speed of ten 
and a half knots (19.45 kph).
82
 Unlike the standard concrete of the European ships, a 
lightweight concrete made of expanded shale aggregate was used for Selma’s 
construction.  
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 Selma was built using a few variations of the basic E.F.C. construction method. 
For the blocking and cribbing, the Mobile yard used heavy timbers at all stages of 
support. Also different from any of the other yards, in the blocking at the Mobile yard 
“the girders are placed longitudinally and for the joists athwartships.”83  
 
 
Figure 10. Selma at sea. Reprinted from Seagoing and other concrete ships.
84 
 
The building of Selma was the first time a concrete ship of this size was attempted. 
Getting the proper placement of concrete was challenging, and to ensure that the 
concrete spread throughout the reinforcing steel it was mixed to be low viscosity.  
The engineers struggled to produce batches of uniformly mixed concrete to ensure 
proper placement. To combat the problem one of the engineers, Herbert A. Davis, filled 
a six by twelve inch (15.24 by 30.48 cm) cylinder mold with concrete and raised it on 
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fixed vertical tracks.
85
 This removed the concrete from the cylinder and it would sag. 
The sagging was then measured and used to determine how consistent each batch was. 
This same technique was later refined into the modern slump cone test. This was the first 
time that the uniformity of concrete was tested in the field. 
 Serving as an oil tanker, Selma did not last long due to wrecking on the jetties in 
Tampico, Mexico, but it allowed advancements in concrete ship construction. Its 
building allowed for new methods and types of concrete to be used to make a ship, and 
after the sinking the hull was studied to learn more about the properties of concrete in 
seawater. In the 1950s, the used of expanded shale lightweight aggregate as a building 
material had increased nationwide. It was often found to be more practical due to the 
economic advantages and could be made high-strength. Some questioned whether this 
material was suitable for coastal structures. To answer the question, Selma was 
investigated in July 1953 to see how both the concrete and the steel reinforcement held 
up against weather and time. The Expanded Shale, Clay and Slate Institute hired the  
Engineers Testing Laboratory, Inc. (E.T.L.) of Houston, Texas to take samples from the 
hull and compartment ribs and inspected the state of the reinforcing steel and the overall 
state of the concrete.
86
 E.T.L. engineers took concrete samples both above and below the 
waterline. The concrete was found to be in good condition by the visual survey and 
when chiseled out to a depth of ¼ inch (0.635 cm) the interior concrete was found to be 
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dry and without discoloration.
87
 The reinforcing steel was found to be “in excellent 
condition with no pitting of the bars…the slight coating of rust could well have been on 
the bars when they were placed.”88 This was in spite of the fact that in there was only 5/8 
inches (1.59 cm) of concrete over the steel in many areas. Tests of compressive strength 
and bond failure proved that the concrete in Selma was still structurally sound. The study 
gave the concrete industry valuable information about the longevity of expanded shale 
structural concrete in a coastal setting.   
Durham and Darlington 
The concrete vessels constructed in Aransas Pass, Texas, Durham and 
Darlington, represented a completely different construction approach. Originally 
planned as tow barges, before construction they were changed to motored vessels. The 
design consisted of two large concrete pipes joined in intersecting circles, connected by 
flat slabs top and bottom to create the bottom and deck with bow and stern sections 
added on. This design was based on the concept that due to the unique nature of concrete 
building using forms, there were more streamlined shapes that could be used to replace 
traditional ship lines.
89
 These ships were designed to carry 14,000 barrels of oil and had 
a full length of 298 feet (90.83m) and a beam of thirty-three feet nine inches (10.29m).  
A different process was used to construct the concrete hulls at the Aransas Pass 
yard. Rather than making a large form to pour concrete for the entire ship, these ships 
were made in a stern section, a bow section and five cylindrical thirty-foot (9.14m) 
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midship sections for each ship. Each section was built using sliding forms in a vertical 
position. The forms were continuously raised by jacks to ensure each section was free of 
joint lines.
90
  This construction technique had not been used in concrete ships before but 
was often used for grain elevators. Thin sheet steel and wood made up the interior form 
with the steel bars for reinforcing secured to the outside. The outer form was then fitted 
around the reinforcing steel creating a thickness of about twelve or fourteen inches 
(30.38 to 35.56cm).
91
 After each section was completed, it was jacked onto a steel cart  
on railroad tracks that would allow it to be moved to the tilting cradle. From there the 
section would be turned to a horizontal position. The now horizontal piece was then be 
moved into its place in the ship. To join the different sections of the ship together, 
longitudinal reinforcement bars projected past each end of a section. Once placed 
horizontally the sections were joined with the bars of the adjoining section. The open 
joints were then concreted using a cement gun to fill the space and acquire a strong 
bond.
92
  
The only sections that differed in construction techniques were the bow and stern 
sections. The stern section was built in the launching ways using fixed forms. The bow 
had a different shape but otherwise followed the same construction methods as the other 
sections that were added to the stern; it was the last section to be added to the ship.  
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In order to help make the ships more economically viable, they needed to lighten 
the ship from the traditional 150 pounds (68.04kg) per cubic foot of ordinary concrete 
down to a weight of 110 pounds (49.9 kg) per cubic foot. This was achieved using a  
 
 
Figure 11. Section of Aransas Pass concrete ship being shifted to a horizontal position. Reprinted from 
Scientific American.
93 
 
mixture of one-part crushed coke, ½ inch (1.27 cm) and smaller to one-part cement.
94
 
This did not include the weight of the reinforcement. There were other aspects of the 
design that affected weight as well. First, due to the cylindrical design, there was no 
transverse framing and to compensate the concrete was poured to a thickness of ten 
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inches (25.4 cm) at the bottom and seven inches (17.78 cm) at the top. This is a drastic 
difference from the Emergency Fleet Corporation shipyards that were building concrete 
ships over 400 feet (121.92m) in length with concrete that was only four to five inches 
(10.16 to 12.7cm) thick.  
Of the two ships built in Port Aransas, only Durham was ever fully outfitted. For 
propulsion, Durham was equipped with a twin-screw diesel engine imported from 
Sweden powered by fuel oil, but the weight of the hull was more than the engine could 
handle.
95
 The second ship, Darlington, was supposed to be fitted with similar engine, but 
it was never finished beyond the hull.  
There were many challenges for the creation of these ships. A new shipyard had 
to be built, there was a shortage of housing for the men working in the shipyard, and a 
hurricane in 1919 delayed construction. Like the E.F.C. ships, they were not finished 
until after the end of the war, but more significantly they functioned extremely 
ineffectively as ships due to being underpowered and very poor sailors.
96
  
 
Conclusion 
 There is much that can be said about the construction of concrete ships in World 
War I. It was a time of great innovation and experimentation, but the knowledge base 
was limited. Concrete was seen as the ship building material of the future by its 
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proponents. The people who supported its use in World War I were convinced that 
shipbuilding knowledge and trends had simply not caught up with the concept. While 
great strides were made in the designs and building techniques for these ships, their lack 
of employment (and hence the lack of testing) after World War I limited their future 
appeal. In a shipping environment that was oversaturated with ships, slower concrete 
vessels had a hard time competing. Five of the EFC ships became storage facilities once 
their shipping days were done, but this was hardly the future envisioned by their 
designers and builders.
97
  
 From an economic standpoint, concrete did not perform as hoped, but 
developments in concrete construction suffered from supply shortages during the war 
and a surplus of steel and wood ships following the war.
98
 Some of the promised benefits 
were there, but concrete ships lacked tonnage and speed. For all of the innovations that 
were made in concrete hull production during this time, they were allowed to stagnate 
until the start of World War II when a quick to construct, cheap shipping vessel was 
once again in demand.
99
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CHAPTER IV 
VISUAL SURVEY OF SS SELMA 
 
 Selma has been in the same location for nearly a century, being continuously 
exposed to the wind, waves, and occasional storms. Although it has remained stationary, 
over the past decade Selma has suffered noticeable changes to its appearance. Few 
sections of the ship that have not been drastically affected by the environment. A better 
understanding of how Selma’s condition has changed over time may be obtained by 
examining four sets of photos. The photos groups range from early (probably from the 
second quarter of the nineteenth-century) undated images, photos from 2007, from 2012, 
and from 2018. 
Circa 1940-1960 
 The first set of photos are not dated, in black and white, were likely taken 
sometime between 1940 and 1960. While all of these photos are from the General 
Photograph collection at the Corpus Christi Public Library, they are not necessarily all 
taken at the same time or by the same person. They show a ship that is clearly damaged 
(there are a few holes in the deck), but a substantial portion of the upper structure 
remains. The area with the greatest amount of damage appears to be the amidships 
superstructure.  
 53 
 
  
Figure 12. Deck of Selma facing aft. Reprinted with permission of Corpus Christi Public Libraries .
100 
 
Figure 12 was taken from just behind the foredeck looking aft on the port side. 
The deck is in relatively good shape, but the tops of the hatches are showing signs of 
deterioration. The concrete in these areas still appears to be in good condition with only 
a few areas where there might be the reinforcing steel showing. In much worse condition 
than the deck, the superstructure amidships (where the bridge was located) is still 
standing, but the bulkheads have chunks missing around the doorways and the 
reinforcing steel is visible.  
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Figure 13. Stern deck of Selma from amidships. Reprinted with permission of Corpus Christi Public 
Libraries .
101 
 
The condition of the deck is very had to determine in Figure 13, since there is a large 
amount of debris covering it. It seems to be in decent condition as the reinforcing steel is 
not obviously exposed. The clearest area of deterioration is the remainder of rail that 
once encompassed the stern of the ship.   
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Figure 14. Stern deck of Selma. Reprinted with permission of Corpus Christi Public Libraries.102 
 
Figure 14 of the stern shows a grimmer image than the previous ones. The deck in the 
stern is in much worse condition than the forward deck. This section of the deck has 
almost no portion that is not damaged, with both holes and visible steel reinforcement. 
There are two sets of bollards visible, both with tops broken off, but the two chocks still 
appear to be in working order. 
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Figure 15. Deck of Selma, view aft. Reprinted with permission of Corpus Christi Public Libraries.
103 
 
In this image of the starboard side (Figure 15), the deck is in much worse condition than 
on the port side. The reinforcing steel is showing though almost everywhere and there is 
a large hole in the deck exposing five beams. Interestingly, the starboard side of the 
upper structure is in much better shape than the port. Only one section of concrete is 
missing and almost none of the reinforcing steel is visible in this area. 
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Figure 16. Inside Selma superstructure. Reprinted with permission of Corpus Christi Public Libraries.
104 
 
Figure 16 shows a considerable amount of damage within the central 
superstructure. A section of the deck is missing, part of the bulkhead is gone, and 
reinforcing steel is visible. This is the area above the engine room, and it is possible the 
damage occurred when fittings were removed prior to scuttling. There was also damage 
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caused by vandalism. We know this area was damaged by vandalism in 1928 (the local 
paper asked for information on the vandals who destroyed deckhouses on Selma).
105
 
2007 
The second collection of photos date to 2007, around a year before Hurricane Ike 
swept through Galveston. Taken from a boat, these photos present a different perspective 
from the previous images, capturing the outer hull in detail.  
 
 
Figure17. View of Selma from port side, 2007. Reprinted with permission of Amy Borgens.106 
The hull clearly shown in Figure 17 shows extensive erosion and collapse from 
water and wave action. The degradation of the metal is also quite obvious with rust 
stains running down the hull under the metal inserts. Selma is going to pieces. 
 
                                                 
105
 “Notices,” The Galveston Daily News, 25 July 1928. 
106
 Amy Borgens, Personal Communication, 7 July 2018. 
 59 
 
 
Figure 18.View of Selma amidships from starboard with partial view of lower foredeck, 2007. Reprinted 
with permission of Amy Borgens.
107
 
 
 
Figure 19. View of Selma amidships from starboard, 2007. Reprinted with permission of Amy Borgens.
108 
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Figure 20.Selma amidships, view aft, 2007. Reprinted with permission of Amy Borgens. 109 
 
Figures 18, 19, and 20 show the amidships superstructure. In the earlier photos, 
this section of Selma had fully standing walls with missing sections of concrete. Here, 
the upper supports have fallen with the fore and aft bulkheads mostly gone. The port and 
starboard sides still survive with small pieces missing. The side of the ship is stained by 
rust a discoloration by the seawater and is further deteriorating from where the deck 
meets the side of the hull.  
 
 
Figure 21.View of Selma from starboard stern, 2007. Reprinted with permission of Amy Borgens.
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Figure 21 shows definite wear as compared to the 1940s-60s photos. The railing 
feature on the stern port side has only one support standing with the rest reduced to short 
stumps. The chock on the starboard side is damaged with only one small portion 
attached to the base. The bollards seen in Figures 14 and 15 on the starboard side are no 
longer there.  
 
 
 
Figure 22. Selma from the stern, 2007. Reprinted with permission of Amy Borgens.
111 
 
 
Figure 22 highlights the same areas as the previous photos, but shows additional 
details. The deck is clearly in worse shape than in the earlier photos. The back deck is 
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now in direct contact with the water, which was not the case in the earlier photos. This 
suggests the stern has settled in the intervening decades. The base of the bollards can be 
seen in this photo and it is clear that only a few inches of the shafts remain. The upper 
beams of the central island are being held up by the outer walls, with none of the inner 
supports still standing. This view also shows the bulkhead below the foredeck, which has 
worn around the doorways.  
 
 
 
Figure 23. Selma from port side, 2007. Reprinted with permission of Amy Borgens.
112 
 
 
Figure 23 shows the port side of the bow, with the area above the water in poor 
condition. The steel reinforcing is exposed and there are multiple holes in the side. The 
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condition of the deck is hard to gauge, but reinforcing steel is exposed. The hatches in 
Figure 23 look more deteriorated than the aft hatches that can be seen in Figure 23. The 
metal bands are missing sections and some of the hatches have concrete missing on their 
sides. The concrete and metal pieces of the raised foredeck appear to be in better 
condition than those on the main deck. 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Selma, bow from port side 2007. Reprinted with permission of Amy Borgens.
113
 
 
Figure 24 shows the aft bulkhead of the foredeck. The condition of the concrete 
above the wave action is still good. The metal bollards and chocks on the raised foredeck 
are in much better condition than those on the main deck. 
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Figure 25. Close up of Selma name port, 2007. Reprinted with permission of Amy Borgens.
114
 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Close up of Selma name starboard, 2007. Reprinted with permission of Amy Borgens.
115
 
In Figures 25 and 26 ‘ELMA’ is still readable on the port side and ‘ELM’ still 
readable on the starboard side. An image facing the bow of the ship (Figure 27) provides 
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a good position to see how regular contact with the water has deteriorated the lower hull 
of Selma.  
 
 
 
Figure 27. Selma, viewed from bow, 2007. Reprinted with permission of Amy Borgens
 
.
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2012 
The third series of photos date from 2012 and once again were taken from a boat. 
There is more exposed reinforcement but the ship shows little change over the five-year 
period, even after surviving another large hurricane, Ike in 2008. The areas most affected 
by the passage of time were also the areas that had the most damage previously. 
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Figure 28. Selma viewed from bow, 2012.
117 
 
Overall, the fore of Selma looks remarkably unchanged from the 2007 to 2012 
photo. The main difference is on the port hawsepipe bolster plate, where the upper 
corner is now missing. The area affected by the wave action still seems to be at 
approximately the same height. From this angle there are no obvious major changes in 
the condition of Selma. 
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Figure 29. Views of ship’s name from starboard, 2012.118 
 
 
The image of the ship’s name in Figure 29 looks very similar to Figure 28, but 
only ‘EL’ is still visible. The reinforcing steel also appears to be in much worse 
condition with the rust much more apparent. 
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Figure 30. View of Selma bow from port side, 2012.
119
 
 
 
There is no direct comparison photo from 2007, but Figure 30 shows the 
significant deterioration of the concrete on the starboard side with many large holes 
visible. It is noteworthy that there is a hole extending through the entire ship.  
 
 
 
Figure 31. View of Selma amidships port side, 2012.
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Figure 31 shows a significant change in the condition of Selma amidships. In the 
earliest photos (see Figures 12, 15, and 16) the side of the island superstructure was 
largely intact to its upper support beams. In 2007, the sides were still standing with some 
sections of concrete missing and the forward and after bulkheads largely gone. In 2012, 
the walls are clearly falling apart with large holes riddling the structure. 
2018 
The final collection of photos is from 2018, approximately six months after 
hurricane Harvey. These photos show some changes when compared to the 2012 photos, 
most of them in areas that already showed serious damage. What is most surprising 
about the 2018 photos is that there are still parts of the ship that look only moderately 
affected by time and the environment.  
 
 
 
Figure 32. View of Selma from stern, 2018.
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Figure 33. View of Selma stern to amidships from the port side, 2018.
122
 
 
 
Figure 32 shows the good and the bad. The raised foredeck still appears to be 
holding together, but the rest of Selma looks more like what would be expected from a 
ship that has been sitting in the water for ninety-six years. As seen in the 2012 photos, 
the stern of the ship is settling further under the water. There is more of the reinforcing 
steel showing and the opening in the foredeck bulkhead has gotten larger. 
As seen in both Figures 32 and 33, there is still one remaining piece of stern 
railing standing, although it is looking less sturdy than in earlier photos. The hatch 
coamings are also showing significant wear with almost all missing concrete around the 
top. The stern of Selma is clearly affected by its contact with the water. 
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Figure 34. View of Selma from port side of stern, 2018.
123 
 
 
 
Figure 35. View of Selma just forward of amidships looking to the bow, 2018.
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Different from the 2007 photos, the area of Selma afterdeck exposed to wave 
action has increased. It is likely that the action of currents (and storms as well) are 
causing the stern end of the ship to dig its way further into the sediment below.  
 
Figure 35 shows the port side concrete erosion and the extent to which the steel 
reinforcing rods are becoming exposed to the elements. The few sections of the 
superstructure still standing are beginning to fall and the holes in the raised foredeck 
bulkhead are expanding.  
 
Figure 36. View of the bow of Selma from the port, 2018.
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Figure 36 shows how, from 2012 to 2018, the holes in the port side of Selma’s 
bow have become much larger. The metal insert for the fore-mast, which in Figures 22 
and 23 was in the middle of the deck just forward of the superstructure, is now located 
on the port side abaft the foredeck bulkhead. It seems unlikely that wave action could 
have moved the metal piece up the deck, and it is more likely that this was done by 
humans rather than waves.  
 
 
Figure 37. Close up a chock and section of the port side hull on Selma, 2018.
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Figure 37 shows how the steel reinforcement is damaging the concrete from the 
inside due to expansive forces of iron corrosion causing the concrete to spall off the 
sides and deck. The outside of the concrete that still has the outer layer looks like it is in 
fairly good condition, but there is staining from the steel rods deteriorating underneath 
the surface. 
 
 
 
Figure 38. View of Selma, amidships deck, 2018.
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Figure 39. Close up of concrete on Selma, 2018.
128
 
 
 
Figure 38 shows the large holes in the deteriorated deck. The original surface of 
the concrete is gone. The metal deck fittings in this photo are also in poor condition with 
the bollards posts missing their upper ends. 
Figure 39 indicates that in a few places the original surface of the concrete has 
survived, complete with impressions of the planks that formed the construction molds. In 
all of these images we can see that the deterioration of the steel inside the concrete is 
damaging the integrity of the hull as much or more than the actions of outside wave and 
currents.  
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Figure 40. View of the bow of Selma, 2018.
129
 
 
 
 As expected, the condition of Selma has deteriorated greatly over time, with the 
stern degrading at the fastest rate and the bow holding up longer (Figure 40). The ship 
has been exposed to many deteriorating factors such as storms, waves, currents, salt 
water, vandalism, and particularly the effects of iron corrosion causing the concrete to 
spall and check. The rate of degradation of Selma does not appear to be changing too 
much, but the areas with issues are only increasing. It is a large mass of concrete and 
steel, however, and even in its deteriorated condition, Selma will continue to be a 
landmark in Galveston Bay for many years to come.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Concrete was briefly considered to be one answer to the merchant ship shortage 
in World War I. The United States was only formally engaged in the war for one year 
and seven months, however, and in this short span the E.F.C. shipping program was 
unable to articulate the quick construction needed to truly make a difference. The 
concrete ships of World War I represent an important aspect of United States maritime 
history but are often overlooked due to their limited contribution to the war effort and 
unlikely nature. The unique construction of these ships shows a combination of 
ingenuity and shortages that the war created. While concrete-hulled ships did not 
become a viable investment for everyday shipping, building with concrete is uniquely 
suited to wartime when scarcities of manpower and supplies created opportunities for 
non-traditional approaches to meet demands. Sir Owen Williams, who designed 
Britain’s concrete ships in World War II, perhaps said it best: “I do not suggest that all-
concrete ships will ever replace steel ones, but it is certain that there is a real place for 
them in wartime.”130 
The concrete shipwrecks in the Galveston, Texas area represent two different 
construction techniques and approaches to the challenge of quickly and cheaply making 
oil tankers from concrete. Unfortunately, both methods of construction fell short of 
expectations. The E.F.C. ships were not produced in the projected quick timeline, and 
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the Aransas Pass vessels lacked seaworthiness. Even with these drawbacks, the 
experimental use of concrete as a shipbuilding material provided technological advances 
to concrete construction in general and in the long term provided useful information on 
the durability of concrete in maritime environments. 
 Due to the limitations of concrete, it seems unlikely that it will ever become the 
standard material for building seagoing ships. Concrete is not used for today’s large 
merchant ships, but it is still present in maritime construction and shipbuilding. 
Ferrocement has been used in the past to create sailboats and was a popular do-it-
yourself option in the 1960s and 1970s. It was also used for a range of smaller craft from 
fishing trawlers to yachts. Where concrete has proved more useful is in the production of 
non-seagoing vessels. Barges and docks are common industrial maritime structures that 
use concrete on a large scale.  While it is unlikely that any large concrete ships are going 
to be used in the near future, the development of new concrete uses in the maritime 
setting will no doubt continue. 
 Selma, Durham, and other World War I-era concrete ship did not create a 
demand during their use in the post war era, but their impact was significant. Selma has 
lived on beyond its abandonment, with a rich legacy of local history from many stories 
and legends arising since it was scuttled. To this day, Selma is still a popular fishing spot 
and a monument in the bay to a history that many have been forgotten. The other two 
concrete ships off of Bolivar peninsula are also a popular fishing spots and are 
mentioned on fishing site forums relating to the area. These ships are an important part 
of both the United States and Galveston, Texas history. 
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APPENDIX A 
OTHER UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOAD  
CONCRETE SHIPS OF WORLD WAR I 
 
 
Polias – Experimental concrete ship built by the Fougner Concrete Shipbuilding Co. in 
North Beach, Flushing Bay, New York. With a gross weight of 2,564 tons, Polias was 
launched on 22 May 1919.  
Atlantus – Experimental concrete ship built by the Liberty Shipbuilding Co. in 
Brunswick, Georgia. Atlantus had a gross weight of 2,391 tons and launched on 4 
December 1918.  
Cape Fear – Sister ship of Sapona, built by the Liberty Shipbuilding Co. in Wilmington, 
North Carolina. One of the 3,500 deadweight ships, Cape Fear was launched 31 July 
1919. 
Sapona – Sister ship of Cape Fear, built by the Liberty Shipbuilding Co. in Wilmington, 
North Carolina. Sapona was a 3,500 deadweight ship and was launched 11 October 
1919. 
Latham – Sister ship of Selma built by Fred T. Lay and Co. in Mobile, Alabama. Latham 
was a 7,500 deadweight type. 
Cuyamaca – A 7500 deadweight type, Cuyamaca was built by the Pacific Marine 
Construction Company and launched in San Diego, California on 15 September 1920. Its 
sister ship was the San Pasqual. It was used as an oil carrier and then as floating oil 
storage. The ship was finally dismantled in 1924. 
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San Pasqual – Sister ship to the Cuyamaca, it was built by the Pacific Marine 
Construction Company in San Diego, California. Launched on 28 June 1920, San 
Pasqual was another 7,500 deadweight type ship. It was used for a short time as an oil 
tanker, but after being damaged in a storm was used as a storage ship in Cuba.
131
  
Palo Alto – Registered on 23 October 1920 in San Francisco, California Palo Alto was 
offered for sale upon completion. A sale in the works for this ship and its sister ship 
Peralta, but it did not appear to go through as the ships were instead laid up in San 
Francisco. In 1924, Palo Alto was sold for $18,750 and dismantled. In 1930 she was 
turned into a fishing pier in Monterey Bay.  
Peralta – Registered around the same time as Palo Alto, Peralta, also built in San 
Francisco, California and was laid up until also being sold in 1924 for $15,000. The hull 
was stripped of machinery and sold for used as a fish reduction plant in Alaska. In 1932, 
it was moved back down to California for use as a fish reduction plant for sardines. 
Following this use it was moored until being sold to be a floating breakwater in Canada. 
Dinsmore – Built in Jacksonville, Florida and registered on 5 March 1921, Dinsmore 
made one voyage to Mobile, Alabama. In Mobile, the vessel was used as an oil storage 
tanker until 1932. In 1935 Dinsmore was sunk as a breakwater off of Texas, but the 
exact location is unknown. 
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Moffitt – Sister ship of Dinsmore, also built in Jacksonville, Florida, Moffitt was 
registered on 13 April 1921. It made one trip to Mobile where it was then laid up until 
1924 when the machinery was removed. It was then sold for use as a barge.
132
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APPENDIX B 
CONSTRUCTION SEQUENCE  
(AS EMPLOYED DURING WORLD WAR I) 
 
 The Lead Engineer R.J. Wig described the construction sequence for World War 
I-era concrete ships in a 1919 paper for the Society of Naval Architects and Marine 
Engineers as:  
1. The underpinning or blocking for supporting the floor forms is set in 
position on the ways. 
2. The scaffolding with overhead trusses for holding the outside forms is 
set in position. 
3. The outside bottom and side forms were erected complete, thus 
providing means for supporting the reinforcing steel. 
4. All steel inserts such as sea chests, stern frame, stem plate, hawse pipes, 
etc., are secured in place on the inside of the outside forms. 
5. The bottom and side shell reinforcing steel is placed within the outside 
forms. 
6. The bottom and side frame steel and the keelson reinforcing steel is 
erected. Splice bars between the bulkheads and shell are placed in 
position.  
7. The inside frame, keelson and side shell forms are erected to the height 
of 4 or 5 feet. 
8. Concrete is placed in the keelsons and in the bottom and sides of shell 
and frames up to the 4 or 5 foot draught line. 
9. Bottom inside forms are removed and the concrete is pointed up where 
necessary. Top surface of concrete, where it will join the succeeding 
pour of concrete, is thoroughly cleaned and roughened. 
10. The erection of the frame and bulkhead steel is continued up to the 
elevation of the second deck.  
11. The inside frame, bulkhead and shell forms are erected up to the second 
deck.  
12. Inserts for pipes, equipment, etc., in frames and bulkheads are set in 
place.  
13. Concrete is placed up on the underside of the second deck. 
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14. The inside forms are removed from the frames and bulkheads, the 
concrete is pointed, and the upper surface which makes a joint with the 
next lift is cleaned and roughened. 
15. Forms for the second deck beams and slab are placed, supported on 
inside staging and props from the concrete keelsons and frames. 
16. Inserts for equipment and pipes in the second deck are placed. 
17. The reinforcing steel in the second deck is placed. 
18. The concrete is placed in the slab and beams of the second deck. 
19. The inside frame and bulkhead reinforcing steel is erected to the top 
deck. 
20. The inside shell, bulkhead and frame forms are erected to the top deck. 
21. Inserts for equipment and pipes in frames and bulkheads between the 
second and top decks are placed. 
22. Concrete is placed in the shell, bulkheads, and frames to the under side 
of the fillet at the top deck. 
23. The upper surface of the concrete which makes a joint with the next pour 
is cleaned and roughened. 
24. The top deck beams and slab forms are placed. 
25. The deck inserts for equipment, pipes, etc., are placed. 
26. The longitudinal reinforcing steel is placed in the fillet at the top deck 
and in the deck beams and slab. 
27. Concrete is placed in the top deck fillet, the deck beams and the deck 
slab.  
28. The reinforcing steel is placed in the hatch coamings, bulwarks and deck 
erections. 
29. The forms are placed for hatch coamings, bulwarks, and deck erections.  
30. The concrete is placed in all deck erections.  
31. All the remaining inside forms and staging are removed and all interior 
surfaces of the concrete are cleaned and pointed. All outside forms on 
the sides and bottom of the hull are removed, and the concrete is cleaned 
and pointed where defective. 
32. All tanks are tested up to the light draught line and pointing and patching 
of concrete is done if found necessary after testing. 
33. The exterior and, if time permits before launching, the interior surfaces 
of the concrete are painted. 
34. The launching ways are placed in position under the hull, the blocking is 
changed, and the hull is launched.
133
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APPENDIX C 
WORLD WAR II CONCRETE SHIPS 
 
With the start of World War II, increasing the shipping tonnage once again 
became a necessity. As with World War I, steel became difficult to obtain, so concrete 
was again chosen as a secondary building material. The concrete building program 
originally was limited to barges, but expanded to included self-propelled vessels in 1942 
when twenty-four were contracted to McCloskey and Co. of Philadelphia.  
The concrete used for the World War II ships was slightly heavier at around 115 
pounds (52 kg) per cubic foot when comparted to the E.F.C. ships of World War I. 
While the concrete mix was slightly different, the construction method was very similar. 
The ships were poured from the bottom in vertical sections. The slightly more robust 
concrete was an improvement to the ships as three of the vessels weathered hurricanes 
without being seriously damaged.  
The ships were launched in groups of three starting in July 1943 and finishing in 
September 1944. Unlike the World War I ships, all of the contracted ships were finished. 
This was helped by the more realistic number contracted and the use of a single 
company. The ships were used in both the Pacific and Atlantic theatres, with many in the 
Pacific being used as store ships. Two of the first ships launched were damaged during 
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their launches, quickly removed from service, and subsequently sunk as breakwaters off 
Normandy.
134
  
The concrete shipbuilding program of World War II took advantage of lessons 
from the previous attempt. As with the World War I concrete ships, these vessels had 
varying levels of success, but overall those launched during World War II had greater 
success. All of the vessels in the World War II program were launched before the end of 
the war, fifteen of them ended up as breakwaters, while the rest were sunk or wrecked. 
Overall, the later vessels appear to have been built studier and they certainly performed 
better.  
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